sawp 0.12 is available and addresses future compilation failures in
dependent crates.
Updated modbus test case to expect 12 bytes needed instead of 15. This
aligns with expectations as the test case slices 3 bytes off the end of
a 12 byte message so needing 12 bytes is correct.
Ticket #5989
Minimal modifications required on the Suricata side, mainly for fields
becoming private and needing an accessor instead.
Note: As the kerberos parser still depends on der-parser 6.0, we still
have to depend on that so it is depended on, but renamed to
der-parser6. There is not an udpated kerberos-parser yet that uses
der-parser 8.2.0.
Ticket: #5991
Updating snmp-parser required directly depending on the asn1-rs crate
for the Oid type, as snmp-parser does not re-export this type anymore.
Ticket: #5992
Build on Eric's but set the direction on transaction creation when
needed. I think this makes it a little more clear, and easier to
document when creating single direction transactions.
This also somewhat abstracts the inner-workings of a directional
transaction from the implementation.
Ticket: #4759
Stamus team did discover a problem were a signature can shadow
other signatures.
For example, on a PCAP only containing Kerberos protocol and where the
following signature is matching:
alert krb5 $HOME_NET any -> any any (msg:"krb match"; krb5_cname; content:"marlo"; sid:3; rev:1;)
If we add the following signature to the list of signature
alert ssh $HOME_NET any -> any any (msg:"rr"; content:"rr"; flow:established,to_server; sid:4; rev:2;)
Then the Kerberos signature is not matching anymore.
To understand this case, we need some information:
- The krb5_cname is a to_client keyword
- The signal on ssh is to_server
- Kerberos has unidirectional transaction
- kerberos application state progress is a function always returning 1
As the two signatures are in opposite side, they end up in separate
sig group head.
Another fact is that, in the PCAP, the to_server side of the session
is sent first to the detection. It thus hit the sig group head of
the SSH signature. When Suricata runs detection in this direction
the Kerberos application layer send the transaction as it is existing
and because the alstate progress function just return 1 if the transaction
exists. So Suricata runs DetectRunTx() and stops when it sees that
sgh->tx_engines is NULL.
But the transaction is consumed by the engine as it has been evaluated
in one direction and the kerberos transaction are unidirectional so
there is no need to continue looking at it.
This results in no matching of the kerberos signature as the match
should occur in the evaluation of the other side but the transaction
with the data is already seen has been handled.
This problem was discovered on this Kerberos signature but all
the application layer with unidirectional transaction are impacted.
This patch introduces a flag that can be used by application layer
to signal that the TX should not be inspected. By using this flag
on the directional detect_flags_[ts|tc] the application layer can
prevent the TX to be consumed in the wrong direction.
Application layers with unidirectional TX will be updated
in separate commits to set the flag on the direction opposite
to the one they are.
Ticket: #5799
Cargo.lock has to be provided as template, Cargo.lock.in so it can
live beside Cargo.lock in out of tree automake builds, like distcheck.
This will pin Rust dependencies even for git builds, updating
Cargo.lock will now be a manual process that we'll have to take care
of periodically.
The latest Rust will automatically "fix" derivable default
implementation, which is nice, but makes changes that don't meet our
current MSRV, so allow derivable impls for now.
If a file (read/write) SMB record has padding/trailing data
after the buffer being read or written, and that Suricata falls
in one case where it skips the data, it should skip until
the very end of the NBSS record, meaning it should also skip the
padding/trailing data.
Otherwise, an attacker may smuggle some NBSS/SMB record in this
trailing data, that will be interpreted by Suricata, but not
by the SMB client/server, leading to evasions.
Ticket: #5786
When Suricata handles files over SMB, it does not wait for the
NBSS record to be complete, and can stream the payload to the
file... But it did not check the consistency of the SMB record
length being read or written against the NBSS record length.
This could lead to an evasion where an attacker crafts a SMB
write with a too big Length field, and then sends its evil
payload, even if the server returned an error for the write request.
Ticket: #5770
An array of interfaces was being logged without creating an array,
resulting in duplicate "interface" objects being logged. Instead put
these interfaces into an array like already done elsewhere.
Issue: 5814
Remove the second occurrence of tree_id logging which appears to
always be a duplicate of the first tree_id logged, even though they
come from different data structures.
Issue: 5811
The Rust time crate used by the x509-parser crate represents dates
before 1970 as negative numbers which do not survive the conversion to
SCTime_t and formatting with the current time formatting functions.
Instead of fixing our formatting functions to handle such dates,
create a Rust function for logging TLS dates directly to JSON using
the time crate that handles such dates properly.
Also add a FFI function for formatting to a provided C buffer for the
legacy tls-log.
Issue: 5817
When deriving AppLayerEvent, allow the event name to be set with the
"name" attribute in cases where the transformed name is not suitable.
This allows us to use enum variant names like
"FtpEventRequestCommandTooLong" for direct use in C, but is also a
name that doesn't transform well to an event name in rules, where we
want to see "request_command_too_long".
Ticket: #5808
May have been introduced by a24d7dc45c
Function http2_range_open expects to be called only when
tx.file_range is nil. One condition to ensure this is to check
that we are beginning the files contents. The filetracker field
file_open is not fit for this, as it may be reset to false.
UDP parsers should never return error as it should indicate to Suricata
that an unrecoverable error has occurred. UDP being record based for
the most part is almost always recoverable, at least for protocols like
DNS.
As UDP streams getting probed, a stream that does not appear to be DNS
at first, may have a single packet that does look close enough to DNS
to be picked up as DNS causing every subsequent packet to result in a
parser error.
To mitigate this, probe every incoming DNS message header for validity
before continuing onto the body. If the header doesn't validate as
DNS, just ignore the packet so no parse error is registered.
Accept DNS messages with an invalid opcode that are otherwise
valid. Such DNS message will create a parser event.
This is a change of behavior, previously an invalid opcode would cause
the DNS message to not be detected or parsed as DNS.
Issue: #5444
William Correia
Jason Ish
Haleema Khan
Victor Julien
Philippe Antoine
Eric Leblond
Lancer Cheng