*** CID 1211009: Bad bit shift operation (BAD_SHIFT)
/src/output-json-http.c: 265 in JsonHttpLogJSON()
259 /* log custom fields if configured */
260 if (http_ctx->fields != 0)
261 {
262 HttpField f;
263 for (f = HTTP_FIELD_ACCEPT; f < HTTP_FIELD_SIZE; f++)
264 {
>>> CID 1211009: Bad bit shift operation (BAD_SHIFT)
>>> In expression "1 << f", left shifting by more than 31 bits has undefined behavior. The shift amount, "f", is as much as 46.
265 if ((http_ctx->fields & (1<<f)) != 0)
266 {
267 /* prevent logging a field twice if extended logging is
268 enabled */
269 if (((http_ctx->flags & LOG_HTTP_EXTENDED) == 0) ||
270 ((http_ctx->flags & LOG_HTTP_EXTENDED) !=
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*** CID 1211010: Bad bit shift operation (BAD_SHIFT)
/src/output-json-http.c: 492 in OutputHttpLogInitSub()
486 {
487 if ((strcmp(http_fields[f].config_field,
488 field->val) == 0) ||
489 (strcasecmp(http_fields[f].htp_field,
490 field->val) == 0))
491 {
>>> CID 1211010: Bad bit shift operation (BAD_SHIFT)
>>> In expression "1 << f", left shifting by more than 31 bits has undefined behavior. The shift amount, "f", is as much as 46.
492 http_ctx->fields |= (1<<f);
493 break;
494 }
495 }
496 }
497 }
StreamTcpSetDisableRawReassemblyFlag() has the same effect as
AppLayerParserTriggerRawStreamReassembly in that it will force the
raw reassembly to flush out asap. So it is redundant to call both.
Implement StreamTcpSetDisableRawReassemblyFlag() which stops raw
reassembly for _NEW_ segments in a stream direction.
It is used only by TLS/SSL now, to flag the streams as encrypted.
Existing segments will still be reassembled and inspected, while
new segments won't be. This allows for pattern based inspection
of the TLS handshake.
Like is the case with completely disabled 'raw' reassembly, the
logic is that the segments are flagged as completed for 'raw' right
away. So they are not considered in raw reassembly anymore.
As no new segments will be considered, the chunk limit check will
return true on the next call.
Have a single function StreamTcpReturnSegmentCheck determine if a
segment is ready to be removed from the stream.
Handle FLOW_NOPAYLOAD_INSPECT in raw reassembly.
httplog_ctx->fields would not be initialized before setting flags in
it:
Scanbuild:
output-json-http.c:491:46: warning: The left expression of the compound assignment is an uninitialized value. The computed value will also be garbage
http_ctx->fields |= (1<<f);
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ^
1 warning generated.
Drmemory:
~~27874~~ Error #1: UNINITIALIZED READ: reading register eax
~~27874~~ # 0 JsonHttpLogJSON [/home/buildbot/qa/buildbot/donkey/drmemory/Suricata/src/output-json-http.c:260]
~~27874~~ # 1 JsonHttpLogger [/home/buildbot/qa/buildbot/donkey/drmemory/Suricata/src/output-json-http.c:375]
Just memset the whole structure right after initialition.
Fix issue detected byCoverity:
*** CID 1197756: Bad bit shift operation (BAD_SHIFT)
/src/util-rohash.c: 74 in ROHashInit()
68 }
69 if (hash_bits < 4 || hash_bits > 32) {
70 SCLogError(SC_ERR_HASH_TABLE_INIT, "invalid hash_bits setting, valid range is 4-32");
71 return NULL;
72 }
73
>>> CID 1197756: Bad bit shift operation (BAD_SHIFT)
>>> In expression "1U << hash_bits", left shifting by more than 31 bits has undefined behavior. The shift amount, "hash_bits", is as much as 32.
74 uint32_t size = hashsize(hash_bits) * sizeof(ROHashTableOffsets);
75
76 ROHashTable *table = SCMalloc(sizeof(ROHashTable) + size);
77 if (unlikely(table == NULL)) {
78 SCLogError(SC_ERR_HASH_TABLE_INIT, "failed to alloc memory");
79 return NULL;
This was only a potential issue as ROHashInit was only called with
hash_bits 16 in the code.
Bug #1170.
During socket creation all error cases were leading to suricata to
retry the opening of capture. This patch updates this behavior to
have fatal and recoverable error case. In case of a fatal error,
suricata is leaving cleanly.
Change GAP detection logic. If we encounter missing data before
last_ack, we know we have missed data. The receiving host has ack'd
it already, so a retransmission of the missing data is highly
unlikely.
AppLayer reassembly correctly only flags a segment as done when it's
completely used in reassembly. Raw reassembly could flag a partially
used segment as complete as well. In this case the segment could be
discarded early. Further reassembly would miss data, leading to a
gap. Due to this, up to 'window size' bytes worth of segments could
remain in the session for a long time, leading to memory resource
pressure.
This patch sets the flag correctly.
Some traffic is very unbalanced. For example a 4 bytes request
followed by 12mb of response data. If the 4 bytes don't lead to
the protocol being detected, then app layer processing won't
start, but it will not give up either. It will just wait for more
data. This leads to piling up data on the opposite side.
Observed:
TS: 4 bytes. PP failed (bit set), PM has not given up (bit not set).
This makes sense as max_depth is not yet reached.
TC: 12mb. PP and PM failed (bits set).
As ts-PM never gives up, we never consider proto detect complete,
so all segments in either direction are still kept in the session.
This patch adds a cutoff for this case:
- IF for TS we have PP bit set, PM not set, AND
- we have TC both bits set, AND
- proto is unknown, AND
- TC data is 100k already, THEN
- give up on protocol detection.
The same for the opposite direction.
The reassembly gap detection makes use of the window. However, in
midstream mode the window size we use is unreliable, as we have to
assume window scaling is in place. This patch improves midstream
handling of those cases.
In midstream mode we may encounter a case where the data we is beyond
the isn, but below last_ack. This means we're missing some data, that
is already acked so it won't be retransmitted. Therefore, we can
conclude it's a data gap.
If we're getting a lot of data in one direction and the proto for this
direction is unknown, proto detect will hold up segments in the segment
list in the stream. They are held so that if we detect the protocol on
the opposing stream, we can still parse this side of the stream as well.
However, some sessions are very unbalanced. FTP data channels, large
PUT/POST request and many others, can lead to cases where we would have
to store many megabytes worth of segments before we see the opposing
stream. This leads to risks of resource starvation.
In this patch, a cutoff point is enforced. If we've stored 100k in one
direction and we've seen no data in the other direction, we give up.
If we've given up, the applayer_proto_detection_skipped event is set.
app-layer-event: applayer_proto_detection_skipped;
If a TCP session is midstream, we may end up with a case where the
start of an HTTP request is missing. We won't detect HTTP based on
the request. However, the reply is fine, so we detect HTTP anyway.
This leads to passing the incomplete request to the htp parser.
This has been observed, where the http parser then saw many bogus
requests in the incomplete data. This is not limited to HTTP.
To counter this case, a midstream session MUST find it's protocol
in the toserver direction. If not, we assume the start of the
request/toserver is incomplete and no reliable detection and parsing
is possible. So we give up.
If midstream is enabled and the first packet is the syn/ack packet from
the 3whs, initialized server.last_ack to the packets seq.
This fixes tracking the session.
Extended data were freed before the release function was called.
The result was that, in AF_PACKET IPS mode, the release function
was only sending void data because it the content of the extended
data is the content of the packet.
This patch updates the code to have the freeing of extended data
done in the cleaning function for a packet which is called by the
release function. This improves consistency of the code and fixes
the bug.
The direction specific masks were not used correctly. The toserver ones
were only used for 'dp' registrations, the toclient ones only for 'sp'.
The patch merges them.
If a flow matches both an 'sp' based PP registration and a 'dp' based,
until now we would only check the 'dp' one. This patch changes that. It
will inspect both.
Instead of the notion of toserver and toclient protocol detection, use
destination port and source port.
Independent of the data direction, the flow's port settings will be used
to find the correct probing parser, where we first try the dest port,
and if that fails the source port.
Update the configuration file format, where toserver is replaced by 'dp'
and toclient by 'sp'. Toserver is intrepreted as 'dp' and toclient as
'sp' for backwards compatibility.
Example for dns:
dns:
# memcaps. Globally and per flow/state.
#global-memcap: 16mb
#state-memcap: 512kb
# How many unreplied DNS requests are considered a flood.
# If the limit is reached, app-layer-event:dns.flooded; will match.
#request-flood: 500
tcp:
enabled: yes
detection-ports:
dp: 53
udp:
enabled: yes
detection-ports:
dp: 53
Like before, progress of protocol detection is tracked per flow direction.
Bug #1142.
Giuseppe Longo
Victor Julien
Tom DeCanio
Will Metcalf
Eric Leblond
Jason Ish